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Comments
THE MANDATORY INJUNCTION IN LOUISIANA
LOUISIANA CODE OF PRACTICE:
Art. 296. Injunction, or prohibition, is a mandate obtained
from a court, by a plaintiff, prohibiting one from doing an act
which he contends may be injurious to him or impair a right
which he claims.
In many particular situations the articles of the Louisiana
Civil Code and Code of Practice contemplate the granting of spe-
cific relief, that is, protection or redress by way of performance or
nonperformance of the necessary acts,1 instead of the substitu-
tional remedy, damages. In addition, a specific remedy is pro-
vided for general use, the prohibitory injunction.2 But nowhere
do the Louisiana codes expressly provide for use of the manda-
tory injunction as a general remedial device.
The court order commanding the actual performance of acts
deemed necessary for the redress of injuries to others, known to
modern Anglo-American law as the "mandatory injunction," is of
ancient origin. In Roman law, the interdicta served, in the cases
in which they were available, the function of a mandatory injunc-
tion.8 Obedience was impelled by the sanction of damages.! The
interdicta were apparently replaced, under the Justinian Code, by
1. See, for example, Arts. 634-637 (distringas), 829-844 (mandamus), La.
Code of Practice of 1870; Arts. 1926-1928, 2046, 2086 (specific performance),
508 (demolition of works erected on the property of another), 865-868 (de-
struction of new works), La. Civil Code of 1870. See also Arts. 139-140
(subpoena duces tecum), 239-240 (attachment), 284-285 (provisional seizure),
630-632 (writ of possession), La. Code of Practice of 1870; Art. 170 (specific
performance of apprenticeship agreement), La. Civil Code of 1870.
2. Arts. 296-309, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
3. The interdictum probably originated as an unconditional order, affirma-
tive or negative in form. Engelmann and Millar, A History of Continental
Civil Procedure (1927) bk. II, tit. II, c. 1, p. 311, § 48; Wenger, The Roman.
Law of Civil Procedure (1931) 5 Tulane L. Rev. 353, 386. In use about 300
B. C., at the earliest time of which we have definite knowledge, it was framed
as a conditional command. The pretor did not himself inquire into the truth
of the facts alleged by the applicant, but issued the interdictum subject to
the express condition that the premises advanced by the applicant did in fact
exist. Engelmann and Millar, loc. cit. supra. Different interdicta were devel-
oped to fit different types of cases. See Engelmann and Millar, op. cit. supra,
at bk. II, tit. II, p. 312, § 48; Jolowicz, Historical Introduction to the Study
of Roman Law (1932) 235-237; Wenger, Institutes of the Roman Law of Civil
Procedure (rev. ed. transl. by Fisk, 1940) 245-254, § 24.




a general power to grant specific as well as substitutional relief.5
Eighteenth century Spanish law recognized the mandatory court
order.6 In France, the power of a court to order and to forbid was
recognized in practice.7 English equity courts early recognized
the injunctive remedy.8 The mandatory injunction followed in a
more gradual development."
The Louisiana Code of Practice sets forth rather detailed pro-
visions to regulate the issuance of prohibitory injunctions, prob-
ably derived at least in part from Spanish and French sources.' 0
But Louisiana courts soon felt the need of a form of specific relief
complementary to the prohibitory injunction. Like other legal
systems, Louisiana found that damages were inadequate compen-
sation for the invasion of certain legal rights. The prohibitory
injunction was satisfactory so far as it went; but it covered only
part of the need. Some form of relief which could be used to com-
pel performance of acts was required in cases where only actual
5. See Sherman, Epitome of Roman Law (1937) 237, § 456.
6. See Scott, Las Siete Partidas (1931) 3.8.2, 3.32.1, 3.32.12, 3.32.16-17, 3.32.23;
2 Gregorio Lopez, Las Siete Partidas (1789) 3.8.2, 3.32.1, 3.32.12, 3.32.16-17,
3.32.23.
7. The device used is the astreinte, a court order enforced by the sanction
of damages for each day that the order is not complied with. No direct
authority for the procedure is found in the French Code of Civil Procedure,
but some commentators argue that the incidental use of the word "njonc-
tion" in Article 1036 justifies it. See Esmein, L'Origine et Ia Loguique de la
Jurisprudence en Mati~re D'Astreintes (1903) 2 Revue Trimestrielle de Droit
Civil 5, 49 et seq., an excellent discussion of the subject; 4 Garsonnet et
Cdzar-Bru, Trait6 Th~orique et Pratique de Procddure Civil et Commerciale
(3 ed. 1913) 25-26, no 12; Japiot, Trait6 fllmentaire de Procedure Civile et
Commerciale (3 ed. 1935) 145-146, no 162. See also Brodeur, The Injunction
in French Jurisprudence (1940) 14 Tulane L. Rev. 211.
8. See 1 Holdsworth, A History of English Law (1931) 459 at seq.; Mait-
land, Equity (2 ed. 1936) 318 et seq.; 2 Pollock and Maitland, The History of
English Law (1899) 595-596.
9. See 1 High, A Treatise on the Law of Injunctions (4 ed. 1905) 4, § 2;
Spelling and Lewis, A Treatise on the Law Governing Injunctions (1926)
35-42, §§ 22-23. See also Klein, Mandatory Injunctions (1898) 12 Harv. L. Rev.
95; Note (1931) 17 Va. L. Rev. 810. Early equity courts manifested a reluc-
tance to issue the mandatory order. Even when the Injunction began to issue,
it was generally worded in negative form. Only in relatively recent times
has the injunction actually been worded in mandatory form. See Note (1926)
25 Mich. L. Rev. 169, and authorities cited in note 50, infra.
10. Compare with the provisions of Art, 298, La. Code of Practice of 1870,
the provisions of Scott, loc. cit. supra note 6. See also Scott, op. cit. supra
note 6, at 3.2.30. Compare Art. 298, par. 5, La. Code of Practice of 1870,
with Art. 23, French Code of Civil Procedure; Art. 298, par. 6, La. Code of
Practice of 1870, with Art. 869, French Code of Civil Procedure; Art. 298,
par. 10, La. Code of Practice of 1870, with 6 Pothier, Oeuvres (nouv. ed. par.
Merlin, 1831) Procedure Civile, 4.2.6; 7 Id. at Coutumes de Duch6, Builliage et
Privat6 D'Orleans, tit. 20, § 6. Compare, also, with the provisions concerning
new works, Plgeau, Commentairs sur be Code de Procedure Civile (rev. ed.
1827) liv. I, tit. IV, p. 52.
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performance could furnish adequate redress. The mandatory in-
junction was necessary to complete the picture.
The first case to discuss the propriety of issuing a mandatory
injunction was McDonogh v. Calloway." In a suit to force the
removal of obstacles to a passageway, the court, relying upon the
authority of Anglo-American equity rules, declared that:
"An injunction is a remedial writ which courts issue for
the purpose of enforcing their equity jurisdiction. . . . The
writ may be directed to parties, or to public officers, enjoining
them or commanding them to do certain acts or things, or to
abstain from doing them and is as effective in enforcing a
right as in preventing a wrong or injury."1 2
The conclusion was that "the judge below should at once have
granted an order, to have the obstructions . . .removed by the
Sheriff." 8
Here, it will be noted, performance by a public officer was
ordered. But in Pierce v. New Orleans14 the municipal defendant
was itself ordered to close the openings made by its agents in a
wall held in common, because the openings interfered with the
privacy of the plaintiff's residence. "[A]n injunction may compel
parties to do certain acts, as well as to restrain them from act-
ing."'
5
The most complete discussion of the availability of the man-
datory injunction is found in Black v. Good Intent Tow-Boat
Company.", The plaintiff sought an order to compel the defend-
ant to transmit his messages over the latter's telegraph lines. An
injunction issued on an ex parte writ was held to have been prop-
erly dissolved by the trial judge. However, in considering
whether such an order could issue under any circumstances the
court faced the definition of injunction in Article 296 of the Code
of Practice and found it no more a barrier 7 than the absence of
11. 7 Rob. 442 (La. 1844).
12. 7 Rob. at 444-445.
13. 7 Rob. at 446. In Burke v. Wall, 29 La. Ann. 38 (1877), an injunction
ordered the defendant himself to remove obstructions to a cemetery avenue
through which the plaintiff had a right of passage. Unless the judgment
specifically requires the defendant to do the work, however, he cannot be
punished for contempt for failure to obey the injunction and the sheriff must
execute it. Avery v. Police Jury of Iberville, 15 La. Ann. 223 (1860).
14. 18 La. Ann. 242 (1866).
15. 18 La. Ann. at 243.
16. 31 La. Ann. 497 (1879).
17. 31 La. Ann. at 498. The contention was made that the use of disjunc-
tive "or" in the phrase, "injunction or prohibition" (Art. 296, La. Code of
[Vol. IV/
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specific authorization for the remedy.18 The Anglo-American
equity authorities relied upon were found to support the conclu-
sion that the mandatory injunction was available.
In the famous case of Itzkovitch v. Whitaker," the court
hedged somewhat on its previous conclusions. An injunction was
sought to prevent the display of the plaintiff's photograph in a
rogue's gallery. The photograph had already been placed on dis-
play, so the order would obviously require some action by the
defendant. The court justified issuance of the injunction by de-
claring that it was "not strictly mandatory," but only "slightly
mandatory.' 0
Fortunately, the "slightly mandatory" rule has not survived.
But in later cases the court has contributed observations to the
effect that the "general rule" is that an injunction will issue only
in prohibitory form.21 It is idle to speculate on the force of the
so-called "general rule." The cases indicate no great judicial reluc-
tance to grant the mandatory remedy. The mandatory injunction
has been issued to compel the removal of erections and obstruc-
tions from streets and sidewalks, 22 from the banks of navigable
streams," and from public squares.2 4 Defendants have been or-
dered to remove buildings erected by them from the property of
another," to remove or cut levees which interfered with a servi-
Practice of 1870) indicated that the phrase should be considered a definition
of the injunction, thus restricting the writ to its prohibitory form. The court
said: "We are, not inclined to adopt a construction which may shut us off
from sources of relief that ought to be open to us, and particularly when it
is based on the use of a single word, not intended apparently to have such
broad significance."
18. 31 La. Ann. at 499: "Since we do not administer law and equity In
separate courts, it is essential, in interpreting the articles of the Code of
Practice that treat of the writs, peculiar to equity jurisdiction, to give such
effect to them as will make the writs effectual remedies, so far as this can
be done without running counter to the express language of the Code."
19. 115 La. 479, 39 So. 499 (1905).
20. 115 La. at 482, 39 So. at 500.
21. See Broussard v. Cormier, 154 La. 877, 879, 98 So. 403, 404 (1923); Pres-
cott v. Prescott, 174 La. 653, 657, 141 So. 88, 89 (1932).
22. Dudley v. Tilton, 14 La. Ann. 283 (1859); Bell v. Edwards, 37 La. Ann.
475 (1885); Kuhl v. St. Bernard Rendering & Fertilizing Co., 117 La. 86, 41 So.
361 (1906) (removal by defendant or by sheriff at his expense); Porche v.
Barrow, 134 La. 1090, 64 So. 918 (1914); Viering v. Fairbanks, 14 Orl. App.
130 (La. App. 1916).
23. Mayor v. Magnon, 4 Mart. (O.S.) 2 (La. 1815); Herbert v. Benson, 2
La. Ann. 770 (1847). See Allard v. Lobau, 2 Mart. (N.S.) 317 (La. 1824); Board
of Commissioners of Petite Anse Drainage Dist. v. Iberia & Vermilion R.R.,
117 La. 940, 42 So. 433 (1906) (lower court, which was reversed, had ordered
sheriff to remove in default of defendant's doing so).
24. Mayor, etc., of New Orleans v. Gravier, 11 Mart. (O.S.) 620 (La. 1822).
25. Bradley v. Pharr, 45 La. Ann. 426 (1893); Barker v. Houssiere-Latreille
Oil Co., 160 La. 52, 106 So. 672 (1925). See Art. 508, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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tude of drain,26 to dam drainage ditches which aggravated the
servitude of drain on another estate.27
Where a defendant has created a nuisance, he may be ordered
to abate it. He will be compelled to remove from his property
the inflammable materials which constitute a fire hazard to the
plaintiff's property," to close the cracks in his livery stable
through which water splashes and obnoxious odors seep.29 He
must cap his dry well where air seeping through it interferes
with the pumping of an oil well on adjacent property.2 He must
remove his spite wall.81
Although a vast majority of the situations in which a manda-
tory injunction has been issued have involved the protection of
immovables or rights relating thereto, the order is equally avail-
able in other types of cases.22 The specific performance cases in-
dicate, however, that difficulties of administration may dictate
See also the following cases in which the writ was denied on other grounds:
Bryant v. Sholars, 104 La. 786, 29 So. 350 (1901); Pokorny v. Pratt, 110 La.
609, 34 So. 706 (1903); Jennings-Heywood Oil Syndicate v. Heywood Oil Co.,
117 La. 536, 42 So. 126 (1906); Hayne v. Edenborn, 137 La. 393, 68 So. 737
(1915).
26. Leonard v. Kleinpeter, 7 La. Ann. 44 (1852); Sowers v. Shiff, 15 La.
Ann. 300 (1860); Barrow v. Landry, 15 La. Ann. 681 (1860); Guesnard v. Ex-
ecutors of Bird, 33 La. Ann. 796 (1881) (sheriff to remove obstruction); State
ex rel. Yale v. Duffel, 41 La. Ann. 516, 6 So. 512 (1889) (sheriff directed to
remove levee); State ex rel. Shakespeare v. Duffel, 41 La. Ann. 557, 6 So. 514
(1889) (sheriff directed to remove obstructions in drainage canal); New
Iberia Rice-Milling Co. v. Romero, 105 La. 439, 29 So. 876 (1901); Savoie v.
Guillory, 118 La. 455, 43 So. 49 (1907) semble; Broussard v. Cormier, 154 La. 877,
98 So. 403 (1923). See Avery v. Police Jury of Iberville, 12 La. Ann. 554 (1857);
Minor v. Wright, 16 La. Ann. 151 (1861); Town of Leesville v. Kapotsky, 168
La. 342, 122 So. 59 (1929). See also the following cases where the writ was
denied on other grounds: Martin v. Jett, 12 La. 501 (1838); Becknell v. Wein-
dhal, 7 La. Ann. 291 (1852); Town of Leesville v. Kapots[kly , 170 La. 297,
127 So. 729 (1930).
27. Kilgore v. Grevemberg, 10 La. Ann. 689 (1855); Delahoussaye v. Judice,
13 La. Ann. 587 (1858); Sowers v. Shiff, 15 La. Ann. 300 (1860); Barrow v.
Landry, 15 La. Ann. 681 (1860); Kennedy v. Succession of McCollam, 34 La.
Ann. 568 (1882); Ludeling v. Stubbs, 34 La. Ann. 935 (1882) (sheriff to dam
drainage ditches if defendant did not do so in 60 days).
28. Blanc v. Murray, 36 La. Ann. 162 (1834).
29. Dubos v. Dreyfous, 52 La. Ann. 1118, 27 So. 663 (1900).
30. Higgins Oil & Fuel Co. v. Guaranty Oil Co., 145 La. 233, 82 So. 206
(1919).
31. Parker v. Harvey, 164 So. 507 (La. App. 1935). Compare, on the sub-
stantive issue, Parle v. D'Arcy, 28 La. Ann. 424 (1876); Taylor v. Boulware,
35 La. Ann. 469 (1883) (note the injunction issued). See Note (1936) 10 Tulane
L. Rev. 646.
32. The injunctions issued in the cases cited in notes 29 and 31, supra,
were all granted on the ground that the defendant's conduct infringed per-
sonal rights of the plaintiff. See also Pierce v. New Orleans, 18 La. Ann. 242
(1866); Black v. Good Intent Tow-Boat Co., 31 La. Ann. 497 (1879). See dic-
tum in Bruning v. New Orleans Canal and Banking Co., 12 La. Ann. 541
(1857). An injunction to remove obstructions to an alleged servitude of light
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denial of the order where a complex series of acts3" or personal
services" would be required of the defendant.
In the few cases which have actually discussed the availa-
bility of the mandatory injunction in Louisiana, the conclusion of
the court has often been based upon Anglo-American equity au-
thorities. Ample support for judicial development of this reme-
dial device may be found in native materials. The framers of the
Code of Practice apparently contemplated a flexible administra-
tion of justice which would adapt itself to the exigencies of
changing times and to situations unforeseen at the time of redac-
tion. Thus it was provided that, "All judges possess the powers
necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, though
the same be not expressly given by law."35 The constitution au-
thorizes the issuance of "writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibi-
tion, quo warranto, and other needful writs, orders and pro-
cess .... -16 The jurisprudence sanctions the application of reme-
dial measures not expressly authorized by any codal provision.3
And the code articles which provide that "judgments may direct
was denied on substantive grounds in Durant v. Riddell, 12 La. Ann. 746
(1857).
33. See Note (1939) 2 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 198, reviewing the specific
performance cases.
34. See Levine v. Michel, 35 La. Ann. 1121 (1883); Laroussini v. Werlein,
48 La. Ann. 13, 18 So. 704 (1896).
35. Art. 130, La. Code of Practice of 1870. See also Art. 877, La. Code of
Practice of 1870.
36. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 2.
37. The courts, prior to statutory enactment, exercised the power to
appoint receivers for corporations and partnerships. See cases cited
in Note (1942) 4 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 332; (1941) 16 Tulane L. Rev. 146 Title
to real estate is vested by judicial decree although no in rem statute
authorizes such procedure. Note (1939) 2 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 194, 195.
See the following cases authorizing the use of remedies not expressly pro-
vided for: De Lizardi v. Gossett, 1 La. Ann. 138 (1846), and Clarke v.
Saloy, 2 La. Ann. 987 (1847) (judicial distribution of debtor's fund); Louisiana
Board of Trustees of the American Printing-House for the Blind v. Dupuy,
31 La. Ann. 305 (1879), and Riggin v. Watson-Aven Ice Cream Co., 192 La.
469, 188 So. 144 (1939) (consolidation of suits); State ex rel. Dardenne v.
Cole, 33 La. Ann. 1356 (1881) (fixing fees to be paid expert witnesses in crimi-
nal cases), Morris v. Cain, 35 La. Ann. 759 (1883), and Lauterback v. Seik-
mann, 125 La. 839, 51 So. 1008 (1910) (impleading opposing claimants); State
ex rel. Huber v. King, 49 La. Ann. 1503, 22 So. 887 (1897) (imprisonment for
failure to pay alimony); Schwan v. Schwan, 52 La. Ann. 1183, 27 So.'678
(1900) (sequestration of succession property); Lacroix v. Villio,. 123 La. 459,
49 So. 20 (1909) (action for damages for slander of title permitted where
plaintiff not in possession); Allen v. Shreveport Mut. Bldg. Ass'n, 183 La.
521, 164 So. 328 (1935) (dismissal of suit for plaintiff's failure to pay for and
file transcript of testimony). See also, in connection with the general topic,
Clarke v. Peak, 15 La. Ann. 407 (1860); Crescent City Gaslight Co. v. New Or-
leans Gaslight Co., 27 La. Ann. 138 (1875); Covas v. Bertoulin, 45 La. Ann. 160,
11 So. 874 (1893). Compare the following cases refusing to recognize a remedy
not provided for: Columbia Fire Co. v. Purcell, 25 La. Ann. 283 (1873) (enforce-
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that a thing shall be given, or a thing be done"38 indicate that the
mandatory court order was not beyond the contemplation of the
redactors.
The jurisprudence establishes the availability of the manda-
tory injunction. The codes of the state support the correctness
of the courts' conclusion. But what rules should be followed in
determining the propriety of issuing the injunction in a specific
case, the procedure to be followed, and the safeguards which
should be insisted upon for the protection of defendants? With
a single exception, the procedure followed in the reported cases
appears to correspond exactly with the rules applicable to the
issuance of prohibitory injunctions. The uniform absence of dis-
cussion of any incorrectness in this procedure indicates that court
and counsel consider it correct. The situation is certainly a
proper one for the application of the respected civilian technique
of reasoning by analogy.
However, the cases indicate that a mandatory injunction will
issue only after a hearing on the merits, or in support of a pro-
hibitory injunction, 9 and a few cases refuse to grant the remedy
until final judgment.4 0 Despite the rule, the order has been issued
without a hearing.41 It has also been issued after a preliminary
hearing.42 Apparently, Louisiana has not recognized the theory
ment of subpoena duces tecum by contempt process); State ex rel. Hero, 36
La. Ann. 352 (1884) and State, ex rel. Duffy & Behan v. Civil Dist. Court for
Parish of Orleans, 112 La. 182, 36 So. 314 (1904) (enforcement of sequestration
order by contempt process); Manning v. Cohen, 128 La. 148, 54 So. 700 (1911)
(enforcement of specific performance decree by contempt process).
38. Art. 628, La. Code of Practice of 1870. Art. 540, La. Code of Practice
of 1870: "Courts give mandates or orders, which, though they are not termedjudgments, have never the less the same effect as judgments; such are man-
dates of arrest and seizure." See also the provisions cited in note 1, supra.
39. So held in Black v. Good Intent Tow-Boat Co., 31 La. Ann. 497 (1879);
Board of Commissioners of Petite Anse Drainage Dist. v. Iberville & Vermil-
ion R.R., 117 La. 940, 42 So. 433 (1906); Hayne v. Edenborn, 137 La. 393, 68 So.
737 (1915); First Nat. Bank of Abbeville v. Hebert, 163 La. 378, 111 So. 792
(1927). See Barrett v. New Orleans, 33 La. Ann. 542 (1881); State ex rel.
Shakespeare v. Duffel, 41 La. Ann. 557, 560, 6 So. 514, 515 (1889); syllabus by
the court in New Iberia Rice-Milling Co., Ltd. v. Romero, 105 La. 439, 29 So.
876 (1901) and compare the report in 105 La. at 444, 29 So. at 878; Jennings-
Heywood Oil Syndicate v. Heywood Oil Co., 117 La. 536, 542, 42 So. 126, 128
(1906); Broussard v. Cormier, 154 La. 877, 98 So. 403 (1923); Town of Leesville
v. Kapotsky, 168 La. 342, 122 So. 59 (1929).
40. The rule originated at a time when a prohibitory injunction could
be had on ex parte application. See Arts. 303, 307, La. Code of Practice of
1870. Cases refusing to grant the mandatory order until final judgment are
cited In note 43, Infra.
41. McDonogh v. Calloway, 7 Rob. 442 (La. 1844); Petit v. Cormier, 1 Mc-
Gloin 370 (La. App. 1811); State ex rel. Yale v. Duffel, 41 La. Ann. 516, 6 So.
512 (1889); State ex rel. Yale v. Duffel, 41 La. Ann. 557, 6 So. 514 (1889); New
Iberia Rice-Milling Co. v. Romero, 105 La. 439, 29 So. 876 (1901).
42. Pierce v. New Orleans, 18 La. Ann. 242 (1866); Itzkovitch v. Whitaker,
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of the American equity courts that the function of the interlocu-
tory injunction is solely to maintain the status quo."3 On the
other hand, four cases deny the remedy because of the procedural
insufficiency of a preliminary hearing. 44 In each of these cases
the right to possession of or title to land was in dispute. The rule
sanctioned by the jurisprudence is, then, that a mandatory in-
junction will properly issue after the opposing party has had the
opportunity to be heard; although no final judgment has been
reached, except in cases where the right to possession or title is
in dispute. The exception may be justified on the basis that the
respect accorded possession 45 and the seriousness of an adjudica-
tion of title dictate a more deliberate procedure.
Act 29 of 1924 prohibits the issuance of an injunction other
than a temporary restraining order "without opportunity given
for hearing of the opposite party."46 In view of this act can a
mandatory injunction be had today in any case without prelim-
inary hearing? No case has been found deciding the point. The
prohibitory terms of the statute might dictate the categorical
denial of the validity of such a procedure. It has been argued
that such an injunction might, in some instances, violate consti-
tutional requirements of due process of law.47 But the issuance
on ex parte application of a mandatory order coupled with a tem-
porary restraining order might be justified by the considerations
similar to those which originally induced the development of this
form of relief"8 and by the rule announced prior to the statute
that the order.would issue before hearing where it was coupled
with a proper prohibitory injunction.49 Even should it be so held,
it might, as a practical matter, be difficult to present a situation
115 La. 479, 39 So. 499 (1905); Schulman v. Whitaker, 115 La. 628, 39 So. 737
(1905); Broussard v. Cormier, 154 La. 877, 98 So. 403 (1923); Town of Leesville
v. Kapotsky, 168 La. 342, 122 So. 59 (1929).
43. See the equity cases cited in note 50, infra, holding that an interlocu-
tory mandatory injunction will issue to restore the status quo where that
has been wrongfully changed in violation of a prohibitory injunction, and
that the Interlocutory order will also issue when the status quo is one of
action.
44. New Orleans & N.E. R.R. v. Mississippi, T.A.B. & L. R.R., 36 La. Ann.
561 (1884); Jennings-Heywood Oil Syndicate v. Heywood Oil Co., 117 La. 536,
42 So. 126 (1906); Hayne v. Edenborn, 137 La. 393, 68 So. 737 (1915); First
Nat. Bank of Abbeville v. Hebert, 163 La. 368, 111 So. 792 (1927).
45. See Arts. 6, 49, 298(5), La. Code of Practice of 1870.
46. La. Act 29 of 1924, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 2078].
47. See Board of Commissioners of Petite Anse Drainage Dist. v. Iber-
ville & Vermilion R.R., 117 La. 940, 42 So. 433 (1906); Powhatan Coal & Coke
Co. v. Ritz, 60 W.Va. 395, 56 S.E. 257 (1906), mentioning but refusing to decide
the issue.
48. See p. 423, supra.
49. See p. 428, supra, and the cases cited in note 39, supra.
1942]
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where the necessity for action was sufficiently compelling to in-
duce the court to issue the order.5 0 In any event, the party en-
joined should find adequate protection in the bond5' required of
the plaintiff and in his right to seek dissolution of the injunc-
tion.12
ALVIN B. RUBIN
A CIVIL LAW APPROACH TO THE REPARATION OF
EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCES BY ABUSIVE
LANGUAGE
The interest in peace of mind, in the protection of personal
dignity and in freedom from mental disquietude has been ac-
corded only scant legal protection in the United States. Invasions
of this interest have not been recognized as a distinct and inde-
pendent tort. In those cases where it has been felt that recovery
should be allowed, compensation has been granted only in the
form of parasitic damages for the commission of a recognized tort.
Damages have been "tacked on" in actions for assault and battery,'
false imprisonment, 2 libel, and slander." Reluctance to give forth-
50. Such a situation might be presented where a mandatory injunction is
sought to compel the defendant to restore a situation which he has changed
in violation of a prohibitory order. See Levy v. New Orleans Waterworks
Co., 38 La. Ann. 25 (1886), for an example of such a situation. In this case
the mandatory injunction to compel restoration of the status quo prior to
violation of the prohibitory injunction was issued ex parte. Anglo-American
equity courts recognize such a case as a proper one for the issuance of an
interlocutory mandatory order. Keys v. Alligood, 178 N.C. 16, 100 S.E. 113
(1919). See Texas Pipe Line Co. v. Burton Drilling Co., 54 S.W. (2d) 190
(Tex. Civ. App. 1932), noted in (1934) 12 Tex. L. Rev. 235, for a discussion of
the American equity cases on the subject.
51. See La. Act 29 of 1924, § 2 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 2079]; Art. 304, La.
Code of Practice of 1870. But a defendant may, by injunction, be compelled
to restore property wrongfully taken. Petit v. Cormier, 1 McGloin 370 (La.
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